What Is Optimal about Motor Control?  by Friston, Karl
Neuron
PerspectiveWhat Is Optimal about Motor Control?Karl Friston1,*
1The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
*Correspondence: k.friston@ucl.ac.uk
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.10.018
This article poses a controversial question: is optimal control theory useful for understanding motor behavior
or is it a misdirection? This question is becoming acute as people start to conflate internal models in motor
control and perception (Poeppel et al., 2008; Hickok et al., 2011). However, the forward models in motor
control are not the generative models used in perceptual inference. This Perspective tries to highlight the
differences between internal models in motor control and perception and asks whether optimal control is
the right way to think about things. The issues considered here may have broader implications for optimal
decision theory and Bayesian approaches to learning and behavior in general.Introduction
Optimal control theory is currently the dominant paradigm for
understanding motor behavior in formal or computational terms.
It provides a normative model of control that allows many prob-
lems to be addressed in a coherent and principled framework
(Ko¨rding, 2007). Furthermore, it motivates the use of elegant
mathematics to solve some difficult problems that the brain
contends with (Todorov and Jordan, 2002). The basic premise
of optimal control is that optimal movements bring about valu-
able states. This means that movement can be specified with
a value function of states, provided it increases value. Despite
the compelling simplicity of this approach, I think it may bewrong
for two reasons. First, we know from the physics of flow that
motion cannot be specified by a single value function. Second,
optimal control theory assumes that movement is caused (deter-
mined) by value. However, value is an attribute of states that are
caused by movement: it is a consequence, not a cause. This
means that the real problem is to understand the acquisition
and realization of beliefs that cause movement—in other words,
to understandmotor control in terms of inference and beliefs. My
reading of the recent literature is that there is a shift from the
engineering paradigm of optimal control toward a problem
formulation in terms of Bayesian inference. However, this para-
digm shift may not be complete until we dispense with value
functions as the causal explanation of movement. This article
compares optimal control and inference and tries to show that
inference (1) complies with imperatives that apply to all biological
systems, (2) dissolves some hard problems in optimal control, (3)
provides a complete specification of control, (4) is neurobiologi-
cally plausible, and (5) accounts for action without reference to
value. While this may not be important from the point of view
of engineering, it may be important for the critical evaluation of
optimal control in neuroscience.
Recent developments in motor control theory (Tani, 2003;
Verschure et al., 2003; Tani et al., 2004; Jirsa and Kelso, 2005;
Wo¨rgo¨tter and Porr, 2005) emphasize sensorimotor dynamics
and perceptual inference over conventional optimal control
based on forward-inverse models (Miall et al., 1993; Wolpert
et al., 1995; Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Todorov and Jordan,
2002; Todorov, 2004; Bays and Wolpert, 2007; Liu and Todorov,
2007; Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008; Diedrichsen et al., 2010).488 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.See Schaal et al. (2007) for an attempt to reconcile these
perspectives. The basic difference is that optimal control
assumes that behavior can be reduced to optimizing a value
function of states that defines what is optimal. This Perspective
focuses on active inference (Friston et al., 2009) as a formal
example of the inference approach and compares it with optimal
control to ask which of these normative approaches is the most
useful. It concludes that optimality may be better understood in
terms of prior beliefs about behavior as opposed to value func-
tions. It further shows that active inference resolves several
key issues in motor control and unifies current thinking about
Bayes-optimal behavior, perception, and learning. Interestingly,
similar conclusions follow from arguments based on the equilib-
rium point hypothesis (Feldman, 2009); namely, there is no need
for separate inverse and forward models in motor control
because the inverse model can be replaced by (Bayesian) inver-
sion of the forward model. This has no implications for Bayesian
formulations of sensorimotor processing (or learning) but has
profound implications for notions of optimality, cost functions,
and efference copy. We begin with a review of active inference
and then consider optimal control schemes.
Active Inference
Active inference is a corollary of the free-energy principle (Fris-
ton, 2010) and says that both action and perception minimize
surprise. In brief, the motivation for this minimization is to
explain how biological systems maintain their biophysical states
within bounds and thereby resist the second law of thermody-
namics—in other words, to explain how they maintain a homeo-
stasis. They can do this by minimizing the long-term average of
surprise, which implicitly minimizes the entropy of their sensory
states. Surprise is just the negative log probability of the sensory
signals encountered by an agent. In information theory, surprise
is called self information, while in statistics it is the negative log
model evidence or marginal likelihood. Although agents cannot
minimize surprise directly, they can minimize a free energy that
is always greater than surprise; hence the free-energy principle.
Under some simplifying assumptions, this free energy can be
thought of as prediction error. This means that perception can
reduce prediction errors by changing predictions (Dayan et al.,
1995; Rao and Ballard, 1999), while action reduces prediction
errors by changing sensations (Friston et al., 2010). Crucially,
Figure 1. Forward Models in Motor Control
This is a schematic summary of the components commonly found in conventional treatments of optimal motor control. The left side of the figure shows the real
world in terms of motor plant kinetics summarized with a stochastic differential equation. The (hidden) states (x) in this equation comprise variables in extrinsic
(movement-based) and intrinsic (muscle-based) frames of reference; for example, the motion of the fingertip in Euclidean space and changes in the length of
muscle fibers. These states produce exteroceptive (e.g., visual) and proprioceptive (e.g., stretch receptor) sensations through a sensory mapping. Both the
kinetics and sensations are subject to random fluctuations (u). Sensory input (s) is used for hidden-state estimation, summarized here with an extended Kalman-
Bucy filter. This Bayesian filter operates in continuous time and updates state estimates ðbxÞ using predicted motion from a forward model and prediction error
ðs gðbxÞÞ weighted by something called the Kalman gain (K). The prediction error is the difference between sensory input and predictions of that input, gðbxÞ,
given the state estimates. The state estimates are used for optimal control, which returns some control variables (e.g., motor commands) thatminimize future cost
or loss, specified by a cost function c(x,u), under optimal control ð~uÞ. This is alternatively referred to as an inverse model that maps from desired trajectories (in an
extrinsic frame of reference) to controlled changes in the state of muscles (in an intrinsic frame of reference). Optimal control signals are then sent to the motor
plant and (through an efference copy) to the forward model. The forward model then computes the predicted change in hidden states. These predicted changes
are integrated with sensory prediction errors by the Kalman-Bucy filter. In this scheme, the forward model can be regarded as amapping from control to changes
in hidden states. Effectively, its role is to finesse the problem of inferring states and thereby optimize control signals. This is necessary because delays and noise
on sensory signals could easily confound the implicit closed-loop control used by this scheme.
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Perspectivesensations include both exteroceptive and proprioceptive
modalities. This leads to a view of perception as predictive
coding and action as the discharge of motor neurons to cancel
proprioceptive prediction errors through classical reflex arcs.
In this framework, top-down (corticospinal) projections are not
motor command signals per se but are predictions about propri-
oceptive or kinesthetic sensations.
In what follows, we will derive active inference from optimal
control theory to identify those components of optimal control
that are necessary and those that are not. Optimal control can
be cast as active inference with three simplifications: the first
formulates optimal control in terms of predictive coding, the
second replaces optimal control with motor reflex arcs, and
the third replaces value functions with prior beliefs. The first
simplification provides a unifying perspective on perception
and action and highlights the central role of Bayesian filtering
in model inversion. Furthermore, it shows that forward modelsin motor control are not the generative models that are actually
inverted. The second simplification finesses the problem of
delays in descending signals and reinstates classical reflex
arcs as an integral part of motor control. Finally, the replacement
of value and cost functions with prior beliefs about movements
removes the optimal control problem completely.
Conventional Motor Control Schemes and Active
Inference
Figure 1 is based on a nice overview of conventional schemes by
Frens and Donchin (2009). This schematic tries to accommodate
the key ingredients of optimal control, ranging from early notions
about Smith predictors (Miall et al., 1993) to the more recent
synthesis of optimal control and state estimation (Todorov,
2004; Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004; Paulin, 2005). Figure 1 uses
a nonlinear formulation in continuous time to emphasize that
these schemes have to be realized neurobiologically. The threeNeuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 489
Figure 2. Predictive Coding in Motor Control
This represents the same scheme as in the previous figure, but here state estimation has been absorbed into the forward model, and the prediction errors are
represented explicitly. Furthermore, we have made a distinction between exteroceptive ðεeÞ and proprioceptive ðεpÞ prediction errors reporting on hidden states
in extrinsic and intrinsic frames of reference, respectively. These prediction errors are simply the difference between the sensory input observed ðbsÞ and predicted
ðbs =gðbxÞÞ. The resulting scheme now looks like the scheme employed by predictive coding, which also rests on Bayesian (Kalman-Bucy) filtering. In this form,
top-down predictions from the forward model are compared with sensory inputs to produce bottom-up prediction errors (red connections) that enter the
Bayesian filter. Crucially, the mapping from hidden states to sensations is now part of the forward (generative) model.
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a forward model, and (3) state estimation (see figure legend). In
brief, the optimal control computes command signals that mini-
mize some cost function, specifying the desired movement.
Although this seems straightforward, it assumes that an under-
lying optimality equation can be solved (Bellman, 1952). This is
a difficult problem with several approximate solutions, ranging
from backward induction to dynamic programming and rein-
forcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1981). Optimal control
signals depend on the (hidden) states of the motor plant that
are estimated using sensory signals. This estimation is generally
construed as a form of Bayesian filtering, represented here with
a (continuous time) Kalman-Bucy filter. Here, filtering means
estimating hidden states from a sequence of sensory observa-
tions in a Bayes-optimal fashion. This involves supplementing
predicted changes with updates based on sensory prediction
errors. The predicted changes are the outputs of the forward
model, based on state estimates and optimal control signals.
This requires the controller to send an efference copy of its
control signals to the forward model. In this setup, the forward
model can also be regarded as finessing state estimation by
supplementing noisy (and delayed) sensory prediction errors
with predictions to provide Bayes-optimal state estimates.490 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Crucially, these estimates can finesse problems incurred by
sensory delays in the exchange of signals between the central
and peripheral nervous systems.
In summary, conventional schemes rest on separate inverse
and forward models, both of which have to be learned. The
learning of the forward model corresponds to sensorimotor
learning, which is generally considered to be Bayes optimal.
Conversely, learning the inverse model requires some form of
dynamic programming or reinforcement learning and assumes
that movements can be specified with cost functions that are
supplied to the agent.
Predictive Coding and Motor Control
Figure 2 shows a minor rearrangement of the conventional
scheme to highlight its formal relationship with predictive coding.
Mathematically, the predicted changes in hidden states have
been eliminated by substituting the forward model into the state
estimation. This highlights a key point: the generative model in-
verted during state estimation comprises the mapping between
control signals and changes in hidden states and the mapping
from hidden states to sensory consequences. This means that
the forwardmodel is only part of the full generative model implicit
in these schemes. Furthermore, in Figure 2, sensory prediction
errors are represented explicitly to show how their construction
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top-down predictions are compared with bottom-up sensory
information to create a prediction error. Prediction errors are
then passed forward to optimize predictions of the hidden
states, shown here using the Kalman-Bucy filter. There is a large
literature on predictive coding as a model of perceptual infer-
ence, which is considered to be a biologically plausible form of
Bayesian filtering (Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Fris-
ton et al., 2006). Note that the sensory prediction errors in predic-
tive coding (Tseng et al., 2007; Wei and Ko¨rding, 2009) have
nothing to do with reward prediction errors in optimal control
and reinforcement learning (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;
Gla¨scher et al., 2010). Sensory prediction errors are required
for online state estimation (inference) and optimizing (learning)
the forwardmodel. Conversely, reward prediction errors are con-
cerned solely with learning the inverse model, in terms of value
functions or cost-to-go (the path integral of cost under optimal
control). Reward prediction errors are generally invoked in the
context of reward learning; however, exactly the same errors
are required when learning the cost-to-go in motor control.
In summary, it is straightforward to cast optimal motor control
in terms of predictive coding. In this setting, the forward model is
part of a generative model mapping from control to sensory
consequences. This distinction may be trivial from the perspec-
tive of optimal control schemes, but it is important for active
inference, as we will see.
Figure 2 distinguishes between exteroceptive and propriocep-
tive prediction errors on sensations caused by (hidden) states
in extrinsic and intrinsic frames of reference. Here, the (high-
dimensional) intrinsic frame contains the state of the motor plant
(e.g., muscle fibers). Conversely, the (low-dimensional) extrinsic
frame contains movement in extrapersonal space (e.g., a head-
centered frame of reference). Intrinsic and extrinsic frames are
used in the sense of Kakei et al. (2003) and Shipp (2005): Kakei
et al. discuss movement representations in terms of the coordi-
nate transformations that begin with an ‘‘extrinsic coordinate
frame representing the spatial location of a target and end with
an intrinsic coordinate frame describing muscle activation
patterns.’’ In Feldman and Levin (1995), these frames of refer-
ence are considered in terms of physical (intrinsic) and action-
perception (extrinsic) frames. The distinction is important
because optimal control has to invert a mapping from (1) control
signals to consequences in an intrinsic (muscle-based) frame
and then (2) from an intrinsic to an extrinsic (movement-based)
frame in which desired movement is defined. In short, the
inverse mapping comprises two parts: from an extrinsic to an
intrinsic frame and from an intrinsic frame to control signals.
The second part of the inversion is easy because there is a simple
relationship between motor neuron activity and its conse-
quences (if an alpha motor neuron fires, its extrafusal muscle
fibers contract). However, the first part makes inversion difficult
because there aremany intrinsic degrees of freedom that interact
to produce a trajectory in extrinsic coordinates. In what follows,
we will separate the easy (intrinsic) and hard (extrinsic) inverse
problems and then dispense with the hard problem.
Reflex Arcs and the Easy Inverse Problem
Recall that the motivation for state estimation in optimal control
is to finesse problems with noisy and delayed sensory input.However, there are also delays in descending control signals
from the motor cortex. These can be discounted if we consider
classical reflex arcs to be solving the easy (intrinsic) inverse
problem. In other words, if motor neurons are wired to suppress
proprioceptive prediction errors in the dorsal horn of the spinal
cord, they effectively implement an inverse model, mapping
from desired sensory consequences to causes in intrinsic
(muscle-based) coordinates. In this simplification of conven-
tional schemes, descending motor commands become top-
down predictions of proprioceptive sensations conveyed by
primary and secondary sensory afferents. Note that this is not
an open-loop scheme, because top-down predictions are part
of a closed loop that optimizes estimates of hidden states using
bottom-up (e.g., visual) sensations.
This simplification speaks to the recursive and hierarchical
anatomy of the motor system (Grafton and Hamilton, 2007;
Shipp, 2005) and acknowledges the role of nested, closed-
loop dynamics at both peripheral and central levels. In this
scheme, optimal control signals prescribe action indirectly
through predictions about desired proprioceptive conse-
quences. This means that their role is to provide predictions
about changes in hidden states that minimize cost. These
predictions (from the forward model in Figure 1) require optimal
control to solve the hard (extrinsic) inverse problem. However,
this is no longer necessary because control signals are not
required in intrinsic coordinates (because the intrinsic conse-
quences of extrinsic predictions drive action). It is therefore suffi-
cient to provide the forward model with predictions about
desired trajectories in an extrinsic frame of reference. This
means that we do not have to solve the hard problem of working
out how (intrinsic) muscle contractions produce (extrinsic) move-
ments; we only have to solve the forward problem of how
(extrinsic) movements stretch (intrinsic) muscles. In other words,
the inverse model (optimal control) is unnecessary. This brings
us to active inference.
Active Inference, Cost, and Priors
Active inference eschews the hard inverse problem by replacing
optimal control signals that specify muscle movements (in an
intrinsic frame) with prior beliefs about limb trajectories (in an
extrinsic frame). The resulting scheme is shown in Figure 3,
where the forward model now maps from prior beliefs about
desired trajectories to their sensory consequences. This model
is formally identical to hierarchical models used for perceptual
inference. Here, motor commands become descending predic-
tions of proprioceptive sensations, while their exteroceptive
homologs become corollary discharges (see left panel of
Figure 4). In short, with one simple manipulation, we have elimi-
nated the need for optimal control and the intractable solution of
the Bellman optimality equation. This changes the normative
model of motor control fundamentally: optimal control relies on
an inverse model to provide control signals that prescribe trajec-
tories that are optimal in relation to some cost function. In active
inference, the trajectories are Bayes optimal (in relation to
sensory evidence or free energy), and there is no inverse model
or cost function. This is important because Bayes-optimal trajec-
tories do not necessarily have well-defined cost functions (see
below). In short, active inference is consistent with Bayesian
perception and sensorimotor learning of generative forwardNeuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 491
Figure 3. Active Inference
This figure represents the final simplification of the predictive coding scheme of the previous figure. Here, cost functions have been replaced by prior beliefs
about (desired) trajectories in an extrinsic frame of reference. These beliefs enter the Bayesian filter to guide predictions of sensory inputs. Proprioceptive
predictions are fulfilled in the periphery through classical motor reflex arcs, while predictions of exteroceptive inputs correspond to corollary discharge and are an
integral part of perceptual inference. Note that optimal control now reduces to simply suppressing proprioceptive prediction errors. This is active inference.
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This is summarized nicely in Feldman (2009): ‘‘Efference copy-
based and internal model theories consider a problem of
a mapping between desired movements and associated motor
commands. It is assumed that this problem is solved by pre-
programming of the requisite commands with the help of inverse
and forward internal models. In contrast, by utilizing frames of
reference as action-producing tools, the system does not need
to program these commands.’’
It should be noted that there is no free lunch when replacing
cost functions with prior beliefs. It is well known that the compu-
tational complexity of a problem is not reducedwhen formulating
it as an inference problem; see Littman et al. (2001) for a treat-
ment of this in the setting of stochastic satisfiability problems.
This fact is evidenced by the many procedures that are found
in both approximate optimal control and Bayesian inference.
Examples here include minimization of Kullback-Leibler diver-
gences (Todorov, 2008; Kappen et al., 2009) and expectation
maximization (Toussaint and Storkey, 2006), both of which can
be formulated as minimizing free energy (Neal and Hinton,
1998). In one sense, active inference replaces a hard optimal
control problem with a hard inference problem. Having said
this, the nice thing about active inference is that these problems
can be solved in a simple and neurobiologically plausible
fashion: by effectively equipping predictive coding schemes492 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.with classical reflex arcs (see Figure 4 and Mumford, 1992; Fris-
ton, 2008). Perhaps the most definitive argument in favor of
active inference, as a normative model of motor control, is that
prior beliefs about behavior emerge naturally as top-down or
empirical priors during hierarchical perceptual inference. This
contrasts with optimal control, which, at the end of the day, still
has to explain how cost functions themselves are optimized. In
short, active inference eliminates the homunculus implicit in
cost functions.
Active Inference and Optimal Control
In this section, we compare and contrast active inference with
optimal control at a number of different levels. We will start at
the level of implementation and frames of reference and then
turn to relationships at the theoretical level, in terms of the duality
between cost functions and priors and between optimal control
and inference.
In conventional schemes, the intrinsic frame of reference
contains the causes (changes inmuscle length), while the conse-
quences (changes in limb position) are in extrinsic coordinates.
Active inference turns this on its head and regards prior beliefs
that cause movement to exist in an extrinsic frame, while the
consequences unfold in intrinsic coordinates. In what sense
are these perspectives equivalent? Intuitively, one can either re-
gard a limb as being pulled by a muscle or the muscle as being
Figure 4. Hierarchical Message Passing in the Brain
This figure illustrates the sort of neuronal architecture that might implement active inference. The left panel shows a schematic of predictive coding schemes in
which Bayesian filtering is implemented by neuronal message passing between superficial (red) and deep (black) pyramidal cells encoding prediction errors and
conditional predictions or estimates, respectively (Mumford, 1992). In these predictive coding schemes, top-down predictions conveyed by backward
connections are compared with state estimates at the lower level to form a prediction error. This prediction error is then passed forward to update the state
estimates in a Bayes-optimal fashion. In active inference, this scheme is simply extended to include classical reflex arcs, where proprioceptive prediction errors
drive alpha motor neurons in the ventral horn of the spinal cord to elicit extrafusal muscle contractions and changes in primary sensory afferents from muscle
spindles. These suppress prediction errors encoded byRenshaw cells. The right panel presents a schematic of prediction error and state estimation units at some
arbitrary level in a cortical hierarchy. In this example, there is a distinction between hidden states ðxxÞ that model dynamics and hidden causes ðxvÞ that mediate
the influence of one level on the level below. The equations correspond to a generalized Bayesian filtering or predictive coding in generalized coordinates of
motion, as described in (Friston, 2008). In this hierarchical form, f ðiÞ := fðxðiÞx ; xðiÞv Þ corresponds to the equations of motion at the ith level, while gðiÞ :=gðxðiÞx ; xðiÞv Þ links
levels. These equations constitute the agent’s prior beliefs. D is a derivative operator, and PðiÞ represents precision or inverse variance. These equations were
used for the simulations presented in the next figure.
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states (muscle length and limb position), the two scenarios are
identical. In other words, the semantics of push versus pull are
purely heuristic; the underlying trajectories (in both frames of
reference) are simply solutions to the appropriate Euler-
Lagrange equations of motion. In active inference, movements
caused by changes inmuscle length aremodeled asmovements
that cause changes in muscle length; cf. the Passive Motion
Paradigm (Mussa Ivaldi et al., 1988). Intuitively, this makes sense
in that we are aware of movements, not muscles.
Can every movement specified by a cost function also be
specified by a prior belief? An equivalence between cost func-
tions and prior beliefs can be established by appealing to the
complete class theorem (Brown, 1981; Robert, 1992). This states
that any behavior is Bayes optimal for at least one prior belief and
cost function. However, this pair is not necessarily unique, which
means that one can exchange prior beliefs and cost functions to
produce the same motor behavior. This is exploited in active
inference to provide a biologically plausible solution to the motor
control problem that can be regarded as a predictive coding with
motor reflexes. This scheme can also be regarded as an instanceof the equilibrium point hypothesis (Feldman and Levin, 1995), in
which fixed points are replaced by trajectories that are specified
by prior beliefs about motion. In active inference, these are
actually empirical priors that are continuously updated during
the perceptual inversion of hierarchical generative models. In
this setting, the optimal trajectory is just the movement that
has the greatest posterior probability, given the current context.
See Figure 4.
Optimal Control as Inference
The duality between optimal control and estimation has been
clearly articulated by Todorov (2008) and dates back to the
inception of Kalman filtering. This equivalence was exploited
by early proposals to replace cost with an auxiliary random
variable conditioned on a desired observation. This means that
minimizing cost is equivalent to maximizing the likelihood of
desired observations (Cooper, 1988; Pearl, 1988; Shachter,
1988). Subsequent work focused on efficient methods to solve
the ensuing inference problem (Jensen et al., 1994; Zhang,
1998). Later, Dayan and Hinton (1997) proposed an expectation
maximization algorithm for reinforcement learning in the case of
immediate rewards, while Toussaint and Storkey (2006) cast theNeuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 493
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Perspectiveproblem of computing optimal policies as a likelihood maximiza-
tion problem. More recently, variational Bayesian procedures
have been applied to optimal decision-making problems in
Markov decision processes (Botvinick and An, 2008; Hoffman
et al., 2009; Toussaint et al., 2008) and stochastic optimal control
(Mitter and Newton, 2003; Kappen, 2005; van den Broek et al.,
2008; Rawlik et al., 2010). These approaches appeal to varia-
tional techniques to provide efficient and computationally
tractable solutions, in particular by formulating the problem in
terms of Kullback-Leibler minimization (Kappen, 2005) and
path integrals of cost functions using the Feynman-Kac formula
(Theodorou et al., 2010; Braun et al., 2011). So what does active
inference bring to the table?
Prior Beliefs or Cost Functions?
Active inference goes beyond noting a formal equivalence
between optimal control and Bayesian inference. It considers
optimal control a special case of inference in the sense that there
are policies that can be specified by priors that cannot be spec-
ified by cost functions. This follows from the fundamental lemma
of variational calculus, which says that that a policy or trajectory
has both curl-free and divergence-free components, which do
and do not change value, respectively. This means that value
can only specify the curl-free part of a policy. A policy or motion
that is curl free is said to have detailed balance and can be
expressed as the gradient of a Lyapunov or value function (Ao,
2004). The implication is that only prior beliefs can prescribe
divergence-free motion of the sort required to walk or write.
This sort of motion is also called solenoidal, like stirring a cup
of coffee, and cannot be specified with a cost function, because
every part of the trajectory is equally valuable. So why is this not
a problem for active inference?
The difference between active inference and optimal control
lies in the definition of value or its complement, cost-to-go. In
optimal control, value is the path integral of a cost function,
whereas in active inference, value is simply the log probability
or sojourn time a particular state is occupied under prior beliefs
about motion. This sort of value does not require cost functions.
Technically speaking, in stochastic optimal control, action is
prescribed by value, which requires the solution of something
called the Kolmogorov backward equation (Theodorou et al.,
2010; Braun et al., 2011). This equation is integrated from the
future to the present, starting with a cost function over future
or terminal states. Conversely, in active inference, action is
prescribed directly by prior beliefs, and value is determined by
the stationary solution of the Kolmogorov forward equation (Fris-
ton, 2010; Friston and Ao, 2011). See Mitter and Newton (2003)
for a discussion of forward and inverse Bayes formulae and their
variational characterizations in terms of optimality. The forward
type of optimality in active inference is closely related to the
optimality introduced recently for the control of stochastic
nonlinear problems with solenoidal or periodic motion, such as
in locomotion, in which ‘‘the stationary state-distribution of the
optimally-controlled process’’ is approximated (Tassa et al.,
2011). In short, optimal motion is determined by prior beliefs,
which endow states with a particular value; however, value is
a consequence, not a cause, of optimal behavior. The crucial
thing here is that cost-to-go and surprise are the same thing.
This ensures that maximizing the long-term average of value is494 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.the same as minimizing the entropy of sensory states. This is
mandated by the free-energy principle and is the same as maxi-
mizing Bayesian-model evidence. Both value and surprise are
optimized by Bayesian inference, but neither depends on cost
functions. We will see an example of cost-free optimality below.
In summary, the tenet of optimal control lies in the reduction of
optimal motion to flow on a value function, like the downhill flow
of water. Conversely, in active inference, flow is specified directly
in terms of equations of motion that constitute prior beliefs,
like patterns of wind flow. The essential difference is that prior
beliefs can include solenoidal flow (e.g., atmospheric circulation,
or the Coriolis Effect) that cannot be specified with (scalar) value
functions. Having said this, I do not want to overstate the short-
comings of optimal control in specifying limit cycle or solenoidal
motion; for example, there are compelling examples in the
recent literature on simulated walking (Wang et al., 2009). These
schemes employ simultaneous trajectory optimization, which
uses an explicit representation of the trajectory (as opposed to
sequential algorithms that only represent the action sequence)
(Kameswaran and Biegler, 2006). This generalization replaces
cost functions of a particular state with a cost function over
trajectories. Effectively, this converts the problem of optimizing
a sequence of movements into optimizing a value function on
a high-dimensional state space, whose coordinates are states
at different times. A point in this space encodes a sequence or
trajectory. However, this begs the question of how one would
specify an itinerant sequence of sequences, without invoking
even higher-dimensional representations of state space. This is
accommodated easily in inference, in which prior beliefs about
sequences of sequences are encoded directly by hierarchies
of attractors or central pattern generators (Kiebel et al., 2008).
Another generalization of optimal control is to consider value
functions that change with time (Todorov and Jordan, 2002).
Intuitively, this would be like guiding a donkey with a moving
carrot (as opposed to placing the carrot at a fixed location and
hoping the donkey finds it). However, this just replaces questions
about the donkey with questions about how the carrot moves. In
active inference, the carrot can be regarded as prior beliefs (that
specify the desired trajectory), while the donkey is compelled by
posterior beliefs and classical reflexes to follow the carrot.
Efference Copy and Corollary Discharge
Finally, active inference provides a particular interpretation of
efference copy (EC) and corollary discharge that predicts the
sensory consequences of descending motor signals. In active
inference, descending signals are in themselves predictions of
sensory consequences (cf. corollary discharge). In this sense,
every backward connection in the brain (that conveys top-
down predictions) can be regarded as corollary discharge,
reporting the predictions of some sensorimotor construct. The
fact that high-level (amodal) representations have both motor
and sensory consequences highlights the intimate relationship
between action and perception. Note that efference copy per
se disappears in active inference. This may not be too surprising,
given the assertion that the ‘‘solutions to the three classical prob-
lems of action and perception (the posture-movement problem,
problems of kinesthesia, and visual space constancy) offered by
the EC theory in particular or by the internal model theory in
general are physiologically unfeasible’’ (Feldman, 2009).
Figure 5. Active Inference and Action Observation
This schematic summarizes the results of the simulations of action observation reported in Friston et al. (2011). The left panel pictures the brain as a forward or
generative model of itinerant movement trajectories (based on a Lotka-Volterra attractor, whose states are shown as a function of time in colored lines). This
model furnishes predictions about visual and proprioceptive inputs, which prescribe movement through reflex arcs at the level of the spinal cord (inset on the
lower left). The variables have the same meaning as in the previous figures. The mapping between attractor dynamics and proprioceptive consequences is
modeled with Newtonian mechanics on a two-jointed arm whose extremity (red ball) is drawn to a target location (green ball) by an imaginary spring. The location
of the target is prescribed (in an extrinsic frame of reference) by the currently active state in the attractor dynamics. These attractor dynamics and the mapping to
an extrinsic (movement) frame of reference constitute the agent’s prior beliefs. The ensuing posterior beliefs are entrained by visual and proprioceptive sensations
by prediction errors during the process of inference, as summarized in the previous figure. The resulting sequence of movements was configured to resemble
handwriting and is shown as a function of location over time on the lower right (as thick gray lines). The red dots on these trajectories signify when a particular
neuron or neuronal population encoding one of the hidden attractor states was active during action (left) and observation of the same action (right). More
precisely, the dots indicate when responses exceeded half themaximum activity and are shown as a function of limb position. The left panel shows the responses
during action and illustrates both a place-cell-like selectivity and directional selectivity for movement in an extrinsic frame of reference. The equivalent results on
the right were obtained by presenting the same visual information to the agent but removing proprioceptive sensations. This can be considered to be a simulation
of action observation and a mirror of neuron-like activity. This is an interesting example from the point of view of the current discussion, because it highlights the
intimate relationship between perceptual inference and action.
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The arguments above are presented in a rather abstract way,
without substantiating the assumptions or background on which
active inference rests. This omission is probably best addressed
by reference to work showing that cost functions and optimal
policies can be formulated as prior beliefs in the context of
active inference (Friston et al., 2009) and that the same scheme
can be extended to include heuristic policies (Gigerenzer and
Gaissmaier, 2011) formulated using dynamical systems theory
(Friston, 2010). In the motor domain, active inference provides
a plausible account of retinal stabilization, oculomotor reflexes,
saccadic eye movements, cued reaching, sensorimotor integra-
tion, and the learning of autonomous behavior (Friston et al.,
2010). In this context, Bayes-optimal sensorimotor integration
(Ko¨rding and Wolpert, 2004) is an emergent property that is
mandated by absorbing action into perceptual inference. This
is illustrated nicely when simulating action observation. An
example is provided in Figure 5, in which the same scheme is
used to generate autonomous (handwriting) movements and to
recognize the same movements when performed by anotheragent. The equations used in this example can be found in Fris-
ton et al. (2011). This example was chosen to show that the same
(neuronal) representations play the role of prior beliefs during the
prosecution of an action and recognizing the same action when
observed. In this sense, the very existence ofmirror neurons (that
respond selectively to actions and observation of the same
action) are an empirical testament to the duality between opti-
mality and inference. It would be interesting to see whether
this simulation of the mirror neuron system could be reproduced
using optimal control theory (Miall, 2003). This is a slightly disin-
genuous challenge because optimal control cannot reproduce
handwriting as a result of requisite motion being solenoidal. As
noted above, this is a shortcoming of optimal control when it
comes to itinerant (sequential and wandering) movements. In
short, the compete class theorem suggests that any optimal
trajectory specified by a cost function can be specified by a prior
belief but that not every optimal trajectory can be specified by
a cost function.
The issues addressed in this review are largely theoretical in
nature and speak to formal or computational modeling of motorNeuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 495
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control theory or optimal Bayesian inference. However, the
answer has some profound neurobiological implications. For
example, if descending motor commands are top-down predic-
tions, then descending motor efferents should share physiolog-
ical and anatomical characteristics with top-down or backward
connections in other systems. Indeed, descending projections
from primary motor cortex share many features with backward
connections in visual cortex: they originate in infragranular layers
and target cells expressing NMDA receptors. This is somewhat
paradoxical, from the orthodox perspective (Shipp, 2005),
because backward modulatory characteristics (Sherman and
Guillery, 1998) would not be expected of drivingmotor command
signals. This apparent paradox is resolved by active inference,
which also provides a principled explanation for why the motor
cortex is agranular (R. Adams, personal communication).
There are clearly many operational issues that attend the
distinction between optimal control and active inference. For
example, how does active inference compensate for altered
limb dynamics or external perturbations? A treatment of this
can be found in Friston et al. (2010), in which movement trajecto-
ries are shown to be remarkably robust to perturbations, both to
forces on a limb and fluctuations in motor gain. Heuristically,
active inference counters unpredicted forces immediately (to
suppress prediction errors on force); in contrast, optimal control
can only adjust its (state-dependent) control signals after unpre-
dicted forces change the state of the motor plant. Another key
area we have not considered is the learning or acquisition of prior
beliefs. In optimal control, the value function is learned, whereas
in active inference, the problem reduces to learning the parame-
ters (of the equations of motion) that constitute prior beliefs. This
is a standard problem in inference and corresponds to percep-
tual learning. For example, the agent depicted in Figure 5 could
optimize its parameters during action observation (with respect
to free energy) and use them to reproduce observed behavior
during action. Note that this form of imitation learning reduces
to pure perceptual learning and eschews the inverse optimal
control problem of inferring the value function by observing an
optimally controlled system (Dvijotham and Todorov, 2010).
From the point of view of active inference, cost functions
represent one particular way of specifying prior beliefs about
the future. It is interesting to speculate that their formal simplicity
makes them an attractive candidate for representations of goals
at a cognitive level. In other words, in the conscious control of
behavior, we may represent cost functions explicitly. This is
implicit in the use of optimal decision theory to describe planning
and choices (Botvinick and An, 2008; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
However, the arguments presented here suggest that cost
functions per se are not an inherent part of motor control,
because they can only specify the component of movement
trajectories with detailed balance.
Conclusion
In summary, active inference is appealing for several reasons.
First, it dispenses with optimal control (in the sense of solving
optimality equations and learning cost-to-go). This is important
because there are no biologically plausible schemes that can
handle nonlinear (and divergence-free) control problems in496 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.continuous time. Second, it finesses problems with delayed
control signals in classical formulations. In other words, de-
scending corticospinal signals are predictions that are fulfilled
at the peripheral level using fast closed-loop mechanisms (i.e.,
peripheral reflex arcs). These predictions can anticipate delays
if they are part of the generative model. Finally, active inference
resolves Bernstein’s problem (Bernstein, 1967). Bernstein’s
problem rests on the many-to-one mapping from the intrinsic
frame to the extrinsic frame. This induces indeterminacy in
producing a particular trajectory. The resulting, ill-posed nature
of the inverse problem means that one has to invoke auxiliary
objective functions like minimum jerk to provide unique solu-
tions. In active inference, these problems are resolved by prior
beliefs about the trajectory (that may include minimal jerk) that
uniquely determine the (intrinsic) consequences of (extrinsic)
movements.
A forthcoming review of sensorimotor learning (Wolpert et al.,
2011) highlights three key challenges for motor control theory,
which can be addressed in light of the above discussion:
 ‘‘It is not clear whether the learning models developed will
generalize to tasks such as tying shoelaces or learning to
skateboard.’’ Optimal control theory will fail here because
these behaviors (like handwriting) entail solenoidal motion.
 ‘‘To date, relative few principles from the study of biological
sensorimotor control have found their way into robotics.’’
This may be because the solution of the optimal equations
(when they exist) is intractable (or notoriously slow) in real-
istic settings. It is notable that compelling reproductions of
animate movements in robotics (Tani, 2003) can be cast as
active inference, in which the inverse model (optimal
control) is replaced by model inversion.
 ‘‘Although significant progress has beenmade in computa-
tional sensorimotor control, the field has been less
successful in linking computational models to neurobiolog-
ical models of control.’’ This may be because inverse and
forward models do not exist, because there is no optimal
controller. An important corollary of this is that optimal
control schemes require both the forward model and
inverse model to be learned (through use-dependent
learning and value learning, respectively). In active infer-
ence, there is only use-dependent learning of the genera-
tive model.
This essay poses a provocative question about the usefulness
of optimal control, inverse models, and cost functions in motor
control theory. I half expect an answer of the form, ‘‘What you
say is interesting, but you have overlooked one fundamental
problem,’’ or ‘‘Optimal control theory is necessary to explain
the following empirical observation.’’ Perhaps having posed
this question, people will provide answers that will change or
nuance my conclusions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Wellcome trust funded this work. I would like to thank Rick Adams and
James Kilner for help in formulating these ideas and Emo Todorov and Jo¨rn
Diedrichsen for very thoughtful guidance and suggestions in presenting these
ideas.
Neuron
PerspectiveREFERENCES
Ao, P. (2004). Potential in stochastic differential equations: novel construction.
J. Phys. Math. Gen. 37, L25–L30.
Bays, P.M., and Wolpert, D.M. (2007). Computational principles of sensori-
motor control that minimize uncertainty and variability. J. Physiol. 578,
387–396.
Bellman, R. (1952). On the Theory of Dynamic Programming. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 38, 716–719.
Bernstein, N.A. (1967). The Co-ordination and Regulation of Movements
(Oxford: Pergamon Press).
Botvinick, M.M., and An, J. (2008). Goal-directed decision making in
prefrontal cortex: a computational framework. In Advances in Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems (NIPS), D. Koller, Y.Y. Bengio, D. Schuurmans,
L. Bouttou, and A. Culotta, eds. http://books.nips.cc/papers/files/nips21/
NIPS2008_0034.pdf.
Braun, D., Ortega, P., Theodorou, E., and Schaal, S. (2011). Path Integral
Control and Bounded Rationality. ADPRL 2011, (p. ID Code 7312). Paris.
Brown, L.D. (1981). A Complete Class Theorem for Statistical Problems with
Finite Sample Spaces. Ann. Stat. 9, 1289–1300.
Cooper, G. (1988). A Method for Using Belief Networks as Influence Diagrams.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp.
55–63.
Dayan, P., and Hinton, G.E. (1997). Using expectation maximization for rein-
forcement learning. Neural Comput. 9, 271–278.
Dayan, P., Hinton, G.E., Neal, R.M., and Zemel, R.S. (1995). The Helmholtz
machine. Neural Comput. 7, 889–904.
Diedrichsen, J., Shadmehr, R., and Ivry, R.B. (2010). The coordination of
movement: optimal feedback control and beyond. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul.
Ed.) 14, 31–39.
Dvijotham, K., and Todorov, E. (2010). Inverse Optimal Control with Linearly-
Solvable MDPs. Proceedings of the 27th International Conference onMachine
Learning, pp. 335–342. Haifa.
Feldman, A.G. (2009). New insights into action-perception coupling. Exp. Brain
Res. 194, 39–58.
Feldman, A.G., and Levin, M.F. (1995). The origin and use of positional frames
of reference in motor control. Behav. Brain Sci. 18, 723–806.
Frens, M.A., and Donchin, O. (2009). Forward models and state estimation in
compensatory eye movements. Front Cell Neurosci 3, 13.
Friston, K. (2008). Hierarchical models in the brain. PLoS Comput. Biol. 4,
e1000211.
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 11, 127–138.
Friston, K., and Ao, P. (2011). Free-energy, value and attractors. Computa-
tional and mathematical methods in medicine, in press.
Friston, K., Kilner, J., and Harrison, L. (2006). A free energy principle for the
brain. J. Physiol. Paris 100, 70–87.
Friston, K.J., Daunizeau, J., and Kiebel, S.J. (2009). Reinforcement learning or
active inference? PLoS ONE 4, e6421.
Friston, K.J., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., and Kiebel, S.J. (2010). Action and
behavior: a free-energy formulation. Biol. Cybern. 102, 227–260.
Friston, K., Mattout, J., and Kilner, J. (2011). Action understanding and active
inference. Biol. Cybern. 104, 137–160.
Gigerenzer, G., and Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 62, 451–482.
Gla¨scher, J., Daw, N., Dayan, P., and O’Doherty, J.P. (2010). States versus
rewards: dissociable neural prediction error signals underlying model-based
and model-free reinforcement learning. Neuron 66, 585–595.Grafton, S.T., and Hamilton, A.F. (2007). Evidence for a distributed hierarchy of
action representation in the brain. Hum. Mov. Sci. 26, 590–616.
Hickok, G., Houde, J., and Rong, F. (2011). Sensorimotor integration in
speech processing: computational basis and neural organization. Neuron
69, 407–422.
Hoffman, M., de Freitas, N., Doucet, A., and Peters, J. (2009). An expectation
maximization algorithm for continuous Markov decision processes with
arbitrary rewards. Twelfth Int. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics
(AISTATS 2009), pp. 232–239.
Jensen, F., Jensen, V., and Dittmer, S.L. (1994). From influence diagrams to
junction trees. In Proc. of the Tenth Conf. on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelli-
gence (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann), pp. 367–373.
Jirsa, V.K., and Kelso, J.A. (2005). The excitator as a minimal model for
the coordination dynamics of discrete and rhythmic movement generation.
J. Mot. Behav. 37, 35–51.
Kakei, S., Hoffman, D.S., and Strick, P.L. (2003). Sensorimotor transformations
in cortical motor areas. Neurosci. Res. 46, 1–10.
Kameswaran, S., and Biegler, L.T. (2006). Simultaneous dynamic optimization
strategies: Recent advances and challenges. Computers and Chemical
Engineering. 30, 1560–1575.
Kappen, H.J. (2005). Linear theory for control of nonlinear stochastic systems.
Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 200201.
Kappen, H.J., Gomez, Y., and Opper, M. (2009). Optimal control as a graphical
model inference problem. arXiv, arXiv:0901.0633v2, http://arxiv.org/abs/0901.
0633v2.
Kiebel, S.J., Daunizeau, J., and Friston, K.J. (2008). A hierarchy of time-scales
and the brain. PLoS Comput. Biol. 4, e1000209.
Ko¨rding, K. (2007). Decision theory: what ‘‘should’’ the nervous system do?
Science 318, 606–610.
Ko¨rding, K.P., and Wolpert, D.M. (2004). Bayesian integration in sensorimotor
learning. Nature 427, 244–247.
Littman, M.L., Majercik, S.M., and Pitassi, T. (2001). Stochastic boolean satis-
fiability. J. Autom. Reason. 27, 251–296.
Liu, D., and Todorov, E. (2007). Evidence for the flexible sensorimotor strate-
gies predicted by optimal feedback control. J. Neurosci. 27, 9354–9368.
Miall, R.C. (2003). Connecting mirror neurons and forward models. Neurore-
port 14, 2135–2137.
Miall, R.C., Weir, D.J., Wolpert, D.M., and Stein, J.F. (1993). Is the cerebellum
a smith predictor? J. Mot. Behav. 25, 203–216.
Mitter, S., and Newton, N. (2003). A variational approach to nonlinear estima-
tion. SIAM J. Contr. Optim. 42, 1813–1833.
Mumford, D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex. II.
The role of cortico-cortical loops. Biol. Cybern. 66, 241–251.
Mussa Ivaldi, F.A., Morasso, P., and Zaccaria, R. (1988). Kinematic networks.
A distributed model for representing and regularizing motor redundancy.
Biol. Cybern. 60, 1–16.
Neal, R.M., and Hinton, G.E. (1998). A view of the EM algorithm that justifies
incremental sparse and other variants. In Learning in Graphical Models, M.
Jordan, ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic), pp. 355–368.
Paulin, M.G. (2005). Evolution of the cerebellum as a neuronal machine for
Bayesian state estimation. J. Neural Eng. 2, S219–S234.
Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning. In Intelligent Systems: Networks of
Plausible Inference (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann).
Poeppel, D., Idsardi, W.J., and vanWassenhove, V. (2008). Speech perception
at the interface of neurobiology and linguistics. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B
Biol. Sci. 363, 1071–1086.
Rao, R.P., and Ballard, D.H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex:
a functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects.
Nat. Neurosci. 2, 79–87.Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 497
Neuron
PerspectiveRawlik, K., Toussaint, M., and Vijayakumar, S. (2010). Approximate inference
and stochastic optimal control. arXiv, arXiv:1009.3958, http://arxiv.org/abs/
1009.3958.
Robert, C. (1992). L’analyse Statistique Bayesienne (Paris: Economica).
Schaal, S., Mohajerian, P., and Ijspeert, A. (2007). Dynamics systems vs.
optimal control—a unifying view. Prog. Brain Res. 165, 425–445.
Schultz, W., and Dickinson, A. (2000). Neuronal coding of prediction errors.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 23, 473–500.
Shachter, R.D. (1988). Probabilistic inference and influence diagrams. Oper.
Res. 36, 589–605.
Shadmehr, R., and Krakauer, J.W. (2008). A computational neuroanatomy for
motor control. Exp. Brain Res. 185, 359–381.
Sherman, S.M., and Guillery, R.W. (1998). On the actions that one nerve cell
can have on another: distinguishing ‘‘drivers’’ from ‘‘modulators’’. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 95, 7121–7126.
Shipp, S. (2005). The importance of being agranular: a comparative account of
visual andmotor cortex. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 360, 797–814.
Sutton, R.S., and Barto, A.G. (1981). Toward a modern theory of adaptive
networks: expectation and prediction. Psychol. Rev. 88, 135–170.
Tani, J. (2003). Learning to generate articulated behavior through the bottom-
up and the top-down interaction processes. Neural Netw. 16, 11–23.
Tani, J., Ito, M., and Sugita, Y. (2004). Self-organization of distributedly repre-
sented multiple behavior schemata in a mirror system: reviews of robot exper-
iments using RNNPB. Neural Netw. 17, 1273–1289.
Tassa, Y., Erez, T., and Todorov, E. (2011). Optimal limit-cycle control recast
as Bayesian inference. World Congress of the International Federation of
Automatic Control, pp. 4707–4713.
Theodorou, E., Buchli, J., and Schaal, S. (2010). A Generalized Path Integral
Control Approach to Reinforcement Learning. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 11,
3137–3181.
Todorov, E. (2004). Optimality principles in sensorimotor control. Nat. Neuro-
sci. 7, 907–915.
Todorov, E. (2008). General duality between optimal control and estimation.
IEEE Conference on Decisionand Control, pp. 4286–4292.498 Neuron 72, November 3, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc.Todorov, E., and Jordan, M.I. (2002). Optimal feedback control as a theory of
motor coordination. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 1226–1235.
Toussaint, M., and Storkey, A. (2006). Probabilistic inference for solving
discrete and continuous state Markov Decision Processes. Proc. of the
23nd Int. Conf. on Machine Learning, pp. 945–952.
Toussaint, M., Charlin, L., and Poupart, P. (2008). Hierarchical POMDP
controller optimization by likelihood maximization. Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence (UAI 2008), pp. 562–570. AUAI Press.
Tseng, Y.W., Diedrichsen, J., Krakauer, J.W., Shadmehr, R., and Bastian, A.J.
(2007). Sensory prediction errors drive cerebellum-dependent adaptation of
reaching. J. Neurophysiol. 98, 54–62.
van den Broek, B., Wiegerinck, W., and Kappen, B. (2008). Graphical model
inference in optimal control of stochastic multi-agent systems. J. Artif. Intell.
Res. 32, 95–122.
Verschure, P.F., Voegtlin, T., and Douglas, R.J. (2003). Environmentally medi-
ated synergy between perception and behaviour in mobile robots. Nature 425,
620–624.
Wang, J.M., Fleet, D.J., and Hertzmann, A. (2009). Optimizing walking control-
lers. ACM Transactions on Graphics (TOG), SIGGRAPH Asia 2009, Article 168,
pp. 8.
Wei, K., and Ko¨rding, K.P. (2009). Relevance of error: what drives motor adap-
tation? J. Neurophysiol. 101, 655–664.
Wolpert, D.M., and Miall, R.C. (1996). Forward Models for Physiological Motor
Control. Neural Netw. 9, 1265–1279.
Wolpert, D.M., Ghahramani, Z., and Jordan, M.I. (1995). An internal model for
sensorimotor integration. Science 269, 1880–1882.
Wolpert, D.M., Diedrichsen, J., and Flanagan, J.R. (2011). Principles of senso-
rimotor learning. Nat Rev Neurosci., in press.
Wo¨rgo¨tter, F., and Porr, B. (2005). Temporal sequence learning, prediction,
and control: a review of different models and their relation to biological
mechanisms. Neural Comput. 17, 245–319.
Zhang, N.L. (1998). Probabilistic inference in influence diagrams. Comput.
Intell. 14, 475–497.
